We live in an increasingly monitored environment, where Google Earth can zoom into your neighbourhood, streetcams broadcast real-time footage of what's going on outside your house and wireless nannycams can covertly capture video from your own living room. Indeed, despite high-profile discussions about abuses by government espionage apparatuses such as the NSA, it is becoming increasingly apparent that for us average Joes, today's surveillance society means that spying is more apt to be done by our co-worker, the opposing team's coach or the store where we shop.
A rash of cases has highlighted the use of covert electronic intelligence gathering as an aid to cheating in major league sporting events. Most recently, the Women's World Cup of Soccer being held in China has been marred by claims that the host country installed a two-way mirror in Denmark's dressing room in order to monitor pre-game briefings. Given the intensity with which China has embarked on a state-sponsored orgy of espionage in the last decade, such allegations should not be particularly surprising, but a perfect storm of such incidents is forcing the conclusion that sophisticated espionage is endemic at major sporting events.
On September 13, the McLaren racing team was fined $100 million after being found guilty by a Formula 1 rules body of having cheated by purchasing secrets from a mole working for the rival Ferrari team. The
Formula 1 spy case broke at the end of June when signs of the pilferage were detected by Ferrari, and grew to implicate not only technical personnel, but drivers.
Meanwhile in the U.S., the big story broke earlier this week as the New England Patriots were
accused of illegally videotaping signals New York Jets coaches during the NFL season opener. Acting swiftly, by Thursday, the league had handed out a total of $750,000 in fines to the Pats, and docked them a draft pick. Far from contrite, though, Coach Bill Belichick used the occasion to hint at the fact that espionage is a common NFL tactic:
This is not a time to say how much I know about what other teams do to bend the rules by spying, or to say it's wrong to punish me so severely. This is the time for me to take my medicine, admit I was wrong, and apologize to everyone involved.
Of course, in the corporate world, techniques pioneered by intelligence agencies have long been a feature of life in the boardroom; just another characteristic of competitive jockeying for market share. The term used today for the most vanilla form of spying is "Competitive Intelligence", and its practitioners make a great show of discussing the ethics of their profession, claiming that 'true' competitive intel makes use of open source intelligence (OSINT) only, and that any real competitive advantage derives from their ability to analyze and synthesize commonly available data from the internet, newspapers and magazines.
Nevertheless, any attempt on the part of the corporate world to suggest that it does not engage in sabotage, dirty tricks or illegal acquisition of intellectual property is belied by the headlines that erupt on an ongoing basis. One recent example is the scandal involving SAP's theft of secrets from its bitter rival, Oracle. Another embarrassing case of corporate espionage leaked to the public in 2004, when Air Canada, the dominant Canadian airline, accused an upstart competitor of stealing secrets, alleging that "WestJet management used the password of a former Air Canada employee to access a website maintained by Air Canada to download "detailed and commercially sensitive" information." The case was not settled until last May, at a cost to WestJet of $15 million Cdn.
In the United Kingdom, one of the most intensely surveilled countries on earth, concerns are being expressed at the
degree to which the average citizen is being photographed, monitored and recorded. Part of the emerging concern stems from the convergence of several technologies, including individual data cards and digital 'fingerprints', ubiquitous videocameras and the rapid maturation of data mining techniques.
The United States, with its long history of respect for individual civil liberties, is a much less spied upon culture than that of the U.K. But even that, especially in a post-9/11 world, appears to be rapidly changing, and it's clear that the number one threat to privacy is coming from non-state players. In other words, warrantless wiretaps being executed by the NSA is not your main worry; rather, it's being eavesdropped on by your neighbour or your employer.
In large part, this is due to the explosion of affordable commercial off-the-shelf espionage tools. Everything from covert videotaping devices to keystroke loggers can be had from your neighbourhood Spy Shop (and let's face it, the very existence of specialist boutique spy stores is probably the final verdict on our surveillance society)
As fast as technology has moved in the field of digital surveillance, there are signs that a more truly fundamental shift, dizzying in its implications, may be on its way. Hidden deep within the bright promise held out by nanotechnology lies the dark possibility of a more comprehensive form of monitoring and control than has been conceived of so far. Chris Phoenix, of the Center for Responsible Nanotechnology told Reason Online magazine in 2004 that "...nanotech enables the creation of cheap ubiquitous sensors for surveillance. Imagine the East German Stasi with microscopic television cameras in every home, office, car, and on every piece of your clothing." The Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) warns that the privacy implications of nanotech must be considered now, before the technology is matured, since one it is deployed, it will likely be too late:
We should be mindful of the fact that as nanotechnology makes computing capabilities increasingly smaller and more efficient, collecting, storing, sharing and processing large amounts of information will become easier and cheaper...when examining the potential privacy risks that nanotechnology may bring it is important to first determine what type of technical and legal barriers will define the norms for the use of this technology. Historically, Congress has acted in anticipation of potential risk by passing legislation in advance of product introduction into the market...it would be wise for Congress to enact legislation in advance of the adoption of nanotechnology innovations to guard against threats posed to the environment, heath, safety, public welfare, and privacy. Taking action prior to the adoption of nanotechnology innovations may allow for circumvention of problems because this technology may allow for very few or limited opportunities to make post-implementation corrections to processes associated with the technology.
EPIC suggests that any legislation being considered should not focus on prohibiting the ability to conduct surveillance (which may not be possible, anyway) and instead be oriented around ensuring that such surveillance is conducted within the constratints of the Fourth Amendment. In other words, "it's gonna happen, we just need to make it as benign as possible".
Clearly, then, we appear to be on the brink of a radical paradigm shift in our concepts of privay. To whom can we turn to help us understand what the implications of that shift may be on our society so that we can not only prepare the requisite legislative framework, but can also prepare ourselves from the standpoint of competencies and individual tools for coping in such a changed environment?
As it happens, there does exist a band of misfits who have spent countless hours pondering this question, among others. One only has to think of Orwell's 'telescreen', or the 'Copseye' in Larry Niven's novel Cloak of Anarchy to recall that science fiction writers have been pondering the impact of omnipresent surveillance for as much as a century.
Perhaps it is to them we need to turn in order to make sense of what our future holds. Perhaps Big Brother really will be watching us soon.
Or Big Neighbour...





